Should equity in health be target number 1? by Stronks, K. (Karien) & Gunning-Schepers, L.
S O C I A L I N E Q U A L I T I E S I N H E A L T H
Should equity in health be target number 1 ?
KARIEN STRONKS, LOUISE J. GUNN1NG-SCHEPERS •
Policy measures to reduce socioeconomic health differences (SEHD) must be preceded by an analysis of the
possibilities and desirability of a reduction. This paper argues that it is necessary to pursue equality in health,
conceived as equal opportunities to achieve health. This principle is justified as part of the principle of maximizing
Individual freedom of choice, and requires that everyone has the opportunity to be as healthy as possible. By means
of this principle a distinction can be made between unjust, unavoidable, and acceptable health inequalities. The
determinants of SEHD which lead to inequalities considered unjust must be subject to policy. These are living
conditions (physical and social environment and health care) and conditions of choice (e.g. the knowledge of an
individual about the health risks of a certain behaviour). Even if SEHD are considered inequities, sometimes
conflicting interests will make it difficult to propose a health policy to redress these Inequities. These are partly the
consequence of the intersectoral character of a policy aimed at equality of opportunities to attain health, in which
the importance of hearth has to be weighed against other goals. Moreover the impact of such a policy on the individual
free choice has to be critically weighed. Finally in the context of health care policy, conflicts between the principle
of equality and maximizing health can be expected.
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TK ere is no doubt that socioeconomic differences in
health (SEHD) exist, even in welfare states. Empirical
studies in different countries show higher morbidity and
mortality rates among people with a lower education,
lower income, or a lower classified occupation, compared
to people in higher socioeconomic groups (Wilkinson
1986, Fox 1989, Illsley &. Svensson 1990). Now that the
association between socioeconomic position and health
seems to be established, a call for a policy response can be
observed. Whitehead and Dahlgren (1991), who elabor-
ated policy measures to reduce existing inequalities, sum-
marize this trend as follows: The debate is no longer about
whedier inequalities exist but what can be done about
them." (p.1059). In the current debate about the policy
measures to be taken to reduce SEHD, two important
issues have rarely been discussed.
The first concerns the justification of a policy aimed at
reducing SEHD: why is it necessary to reduce socioeconomic
inequalities in health? This question must precede the
development of policy measures. Most often the desira-
bility of such measures is simply assumed, even though the
justification of policy measures is not necessarily self-
evident. We will argue that is necessary to give arguments
for the government's responsibility to reduce SEHD and
to specify the socioeconomic inequalities in health to
which this responsibility applies.
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' If one can show that (some) socioeconomic inequalities
should be reduced, die second question is what possibilities
exist to achieve this. Given die intersectoral character of
such a policy and the fact diat these inequalities in healdi
are inextricably related to socioeconomic structures, con-
flicts of interests in developing policy measures can be
expected. In order to get a realistic idea of die possibilities
of a government to reduce SEHD, die potentials for policy
measures and the inherent constraints should be explored
systematically. In this article we will discuss diese two
questions.
Two preliminary remarks, however, have to be made. So
far equality in public healdi has mostly been discussed in
die context of health care services (Mooney 1983,
Mooneyetal. 1991, Wagstaffetal. 1991, Culver etal. 1992).
Central issues of this debate are the desirability of pursuing
equality in health care, and the implications for healdi care
policy in terms of equal effectiveness or equal access. Al-
though die issue of equality in health is related to equality in
healdi care, die discussion about die justification of policy
measures to reduce inequalities in healdi must not be limited
to die area of healdi care services. Health care is only one of
die determinants of socioeconomic inequalities in health.
Therefore the debate on the just distribution of health care
is a 'second order' debate, which is of importance only after
one has taken a view on the desirability of equality in health.
Furthermore, although the justification of equality has so
far hardly been discussed in die context of the distribution
of health, political and economic sciences have a long
tradition of debate on the justification of equal distribu-
tion in general. We can and will draw upon some of the
elements from diis debate.
Equity in health
SOC1OECONOM1C INEQUALITIES
IN HEALTH AND INEQUITIES
Socioeconomic inequalities in health as observed in the
western world are generally assumed to be unjust. They
are considered socioeconomic inequities in health. The
underlying logic of most people is that, because of the
value of good health for die individual, it is desirable and
necessary to pursue equality in health for all (Stronks
1992). Starting from this assumption, tiiey argue that all
differences in health have to be eliminated. The justifica-
tion for a policy to pursue equality in health is not as
simple as that. In the first place, die question arises
whether one should pursue for instance equality in actual
healdi or equality of opportunity to attain health. Because
equality is open to so many interpretations, this principle
has to be specified before a policy can be formulated
(Whitehead 1990, 1992). Secondly, if a policy is simply
based on the desirability of equality in health, one will
face conflicts with other societal goals. In the western
world equality in health is not automatically seen as the
primary goal, to which, for example, economic goals are
inevitably subordinate. In this section both the justifica-
tion and desirable conception of equality in health will be
discussed.
The justification of the principle of equality in health is
dependent on the reason why health is valued. The in-
trinsic value of health must be distinguished from the
instrumental one. If health is appreciated because of its
intrinsic value, health is considered to be worthwhile per
se. Valuing health on account of its instrumental value
means considering health to be important because it
enables the individual to pursue other values. Health is
defined then as the capability to act or to realize personal
goals (Nordenfelt 1987).
Each of these values leads to different conceptions of
equality in health. The consequence of appreciating
health by its intrinsic value is that equality in health has
to be realized irrespective of other goals a society may
value. Pursuing health becomes a primary goal under all
circumstances. If an instrumental value is attached to
health, equality in health is no longer the primary goal,
but has to compete with other principles like equal oppor-
tunities of education.
In applying the arguments used in political philosophy to
inequality in health, it can be shown that health must be
viewed as a means to realize other goals, and not as a value
on its own. We will base the justification of the principle
of equality in health on the ideas of Sen.
The responsibility of the government to guarantee
equality in health, defined as the capability to act or to
realize personal goals, can be subsumed under the respon-
sibility of guaranteeing each individual the opportunities
to realize his personal goals, also called his individual life
plan. If the latter has been justified, the obligation to
pursue equality in health follows logically from this justi-
fication.
Sen argues that each individual has to be guaranteed
freedom of choice. The justification of this ideal can be
based on the principle of equal concern and respect (Lar-
more 1987, Dworkin 1987). According to that principle
each individual is due equal respect, by virtue of his
capacity to work out his own conception of the good life:
"To have respect for a person is to view him as capable of
elaborating beliefs that we would respect." (Larmore
1987, p.64).
As a consequence each person should have the oppor-
tunity to plan his own life. The government is not allowed
to favour some groups or persons above others, for
example because it believes the ideas of the former are
better than those of the latter. As a consequence of the
principle of equal concern and respect, the individual
freedom has to be valued highly. Freedom based on the
wish to show every individual equal concern and respect
is called positive freedom and can be described as follows.
The ideal of the individual who has the freedom to lead
the life he considers worthwhile requires a minimal inter-
ference by others. There must be some area in which the
individual is free to decide. Neither the government nor
any other citizen is allowed to prevent the individual
inside this area from doing the things he wants to do. This
is called negative freedom. However, being free in the
'negative' sense is not sufficient to work out a lifeplan.
This ideal requires more than the absence of interference
by others. It shifts the attention from interference by
others to the things an individual can actually do. Firstly,
a person must have an opportunity to choose between
different ways of living which are all meaningful to him.
He must have the freedom to choose from these different
life plans the plan which agrees most with his own con-
ception of the good life. Furthermore he must be able to
realize his own life plan as much as possible. If these
conditions are met, an individual is free in the positive
sense (Berlin 1969, Benn &. Weinstein 1971).
Positive freedom can therefore be formulated as freedom
of choice. Justice through the ideal of positive freedom
means guaranteeing each individual an equal ability to
choose freely. This implies that conditions have to be created
that make it possible for each individual to choose the life
plan that seems the best to him. Moreover, each individual
must have equal prospects of realizing this life plan.
Sen (1985, 1988, 1990) argues that the freedom a person
has is reflected in the different ways of living from which
he can choose. These different ways of living can be
phrased in terms of alternative combinations of function-
ings or doings and beings. Examples of these are: being
adequately nourished and having the opportunity to fol-
low (qualified) education. These so-called 'capabilities'
determine the range and content of the life plans an
individual can choose from. Maximizing the individual
freedom of choice therefore means guaranteeing each
individual as many ways of functionings and beings as
possible. The possibility to lead a long and healthy life
then becomes just another condition for individual free-
dom of choice. In other words, good health can be defined
as a 'basic capability'. The absence or presence of this
capability determines the life plans from which an indi-
vidual can choose and a restriction of this capability
implies a reduction of the alternative.
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In this view promoting positive freedom therefore means
enhancing human capabilities, among others the capa-
bility of being in good health. Given these capabilities,
individuals can differ in the value they attach to different
ways of functioning, for example to being as healthy as
possible. In the notion of positive freedom, they are
entitled to do so. Each person then has the right not to
define his life in terms of a long and healthy life, but to
choose for say a 'burgundian' lifestyle. Consequently
equality of health is interpreted as equality of opportunity
to be as healthy as possible. This principle does not require
everyone to have the same level of health, but it demands
such a distribution of determinants of health, to the
extent that they can be controlled, that every individual
has the same possibilities to lead a long and healthy life.
Given those opportunities, the individual reserves the
right to decide whether to use them or not. As a conse-
quence, equality in health justified on the notion of
positive freedom, may well coincide with differences in
actual health.
The definition of equity in health achieved by this argu-
ment is the same as the one used by Whitehead (1990,
1992), but here it is based on theories of social justice.
The justification of the desirability to pursue equality in
health, perceived as equality of opportunity to attain
health, is consistent with the value the western world
attaches to the principle of 'equal concern and respect',
and to positive freedom. Because the government is not
supposed to promote a particular conception of the good
life, each individual should have the right to determine
whether he lives a healthy life or prefers a lifestyle which
can be hazardous to his health. The only thing a govern-
ment is entitled to do is to create conditions that make it
possible for the individual to choose die life plan which
seems best to him. The capability to be as healthy as
possible is such a condition. Health is thus pursued in this
argument for its instrumental value. If we had chosen to
pursue health for its intrinsic value, health would become
a primary goal. A policy to reduce SEHD would then aim
at equality of actual health rather than opportunity for
health. In that case the principle of equality in health
requires everyone to have the same level of health. We
argue that this principle is not compatible with the ideas
on freedom we have in the western world.
If one accepts the principle of equality of opportunities to
attain health, differences in health as observed in western
countries cannot be considered unjust in advance. Whether
inequalities are unjust or not depends on their origins.
Inequalities that are the result of free choices made by an
individual are acceptable. If the society attaches value to
health in order to promote individual freedom of choice,
one must accept the consequence that some people will
not choose good health as their primary goal.
Differences in health, in our context, are unjust if they
result from a situation of inequality of opportunities for
health. That inequality is reflected in an unequal distribu-
tion of determinants of health if these health-influencing
factors are beyond the control of the individual. This
applies to most health-influencing circumstances in
Determinants of |_
health differences
Free, individual choices?
Circumstances to be controlled
by a human being?
yes yes
Normative Acceptable Inequities Unavoidable
judgement inequalities inequalities
which an individual lives. This is of course conditional. If
the distribution of a certain determinant of health is
beyond the control of a human being, like the age dis-
tribution, it cannot be defined in terms of justice or
injustice, if justice is defined as a situation in which equal
cases are treated equally and unequal cases unequally.
This definition already shows that justice presupposes the
acting of a human being. If the distribution of a certain
good is determined by nature, like the distribution of
genetic factors, one may at most judge it unfair. Such an
unequal distribution will be called unavoidable in our
terminology.
This argument can be shown schematically; see figure.
In order to determine which determinants of SEHD result
in acceptable inequalities, unavoidable inequalities or in
inequities, they have to be classified in one of these
categories. When the causes of existing socioeconomic
healdi differences have been obtained, it is possible to
determine which part of the existing inequalities must be
seen as acceptable, unavoidable, or unjust Furthermore
policy measures to reduce unjust inequalities can be ela-
borated.
POSSIBILITIES TO REDUCE SEHD
In the previous pages we have argued that the causes or
determinants of SEHD will determine whether we con-
sider SEHD avoidable and unjust, therefore also ine-
quities. Interventions on these same determinants also
offer us the possibility to influence the existence of SEHD.
However, also the intervention mode itself needs to be
critically weighed and valued to see if it is acceptable to
society. Sometimes conflicting interests will make it dif-
ficult to propose a health policy to redress SEHD even if
they are considered an inequity (Gunning-Schepers 1991).
We will explore the possible causes of the existing socio-
economic health differences and therefore the possible
options for interventions, according to the traditional
division in health determinants used in health policy
making. Determinants of health are often grouped into
five main categories: genetic predisposition, physical en-
vironment, lifestyles, social environment, and health care
(Gunning-Schepers & Hagen 1987). For each determi-
nant we will try to show to what extent resulting inequal-
ities are inequities, and what policy options are available
to reduce inequities. Furthermore we will show the inher-
Equiry in health
ent policy dilemmas when an intervention to reduce
inequities in health through that determinant is placed in
the wider spectrum of just social policy.
Genetic predisposition
• Causes
Genetic predisposition, as well as biological factors such
as ageing, determine much of the variability of health seen
in a population. However so far there is no evidence that
these health differences are systematic nor that they are
unequally distributed over the various socioeconomic
groups (Mascie-Taylor &. McManus 1984). If genetic
factors were to be found essential in the explanation of
socioeconomic health differences, resulting inequalities
must be considered unavoidable, because most of these
health-influencing factors are beyond the control of a
human being.
• Policy options
Although their current unavoidability would not warrant
interventions in this area, this option is further compli-
cated by the fact that genetic interventions encounter
very strong opposition in most societies on ethical
grounds.
• Policy dilemmas
So if in the near future it would be possible to change
genetic configurations, there are ethical choices to be
made about the acceptability to society of these technologi-
cal possibilities, before their use to reduce socioeconomic
health differences may be envisaged.
Physical environment
• Causes
Risk factors in the physical environment are seldom un-
evenly distributed over socioeconomic groups in the
population by nature (Fox SiGoldblatt 1982, Whitehead
1988). It usually requires social elements to achieve
skewed distributions. These are most notable in the risk
factors associated with poor housing, working conditions
and such basic requirements for health as clean drinking
water and adequate sewers. According to the principle of
positive freedom it is the government's responsibility to
achieve an equal distribution of these conditions. Dif-
ferences in health resulting from an unequal distribution
are therefore inequities.
• Policy options
The physical environment is an essential element in the
health protection policies that were so crucial to the first
public health revolution. Since infectious diseases were
the most dangerous threats to public health in that period,
much of the policy tradition is still geared towards achieving
herd immunity. That implies aiming at a broad protection
in the population, if only out of self interest. Because of
that tradition, there is a longstanding political consensus
to achieve an equal distribution of these risk factors.
• Policy dilemmas
They are often the easiest determinants for which a policy
response can be envisaged. However, implementation
will often involve intersectoral action, and thus may
interfere with other socioeconomic goals. Sometimes the
health goals and the other interests of society coincide, as
in die clean drinking water and sewage systems, which
helped increase the productivity of workers by reducing
endemic infectious diseases. However, more often there
are conflicting interests, such as in improving working
conditions while maintaining a healdiy cost-benefit ratio,
or in weighing die healdi costs and die economic benefits
of polluting industries or major transport centres in our
current societies. It is when such basic capabilities, each
necessary for die individual to be able to choose his
preferred life plan conflict diat government encounters a
major policy dilemma.
Lifestyles
• Causes
In discussions about the reduction of socioeconomic dif-
ferences in health, lifestyles are often considered die most
important determinant (Morris 1990). Not only is die
variation in disease frequency for die most important
causes of death explained to a certain extent byjisk factors
connected to lifestyles, but we also know that these risk
factors and the causes of mortality influenced by these risk
factors are unevenly distributed over socioeconomic
groups (Rose &. Marmot 1981, Blaxter 1990).
Smoking is more prevalent among the lower socioeconomic
groups, healthy nutritional habits are not evenly dis-
tributed in society, and alcohol abuse appears to be more
frequently found in lower socioeconomic groups (al-
though die evidence is mixed on diis risk factor), if only
the lower socioeconomic groups would adopt healthier
lifestyles' seems to be a recurrent theme in many a political
debate on socioeconomic differences in healdi. Of course,
just the fact that these are avoidable inequalities in healdi
is not sufficient to make them inequities, as we argued
earlier. The crucial element is whether these are deter-
mined by free choice or not. Only if lifestyles are not the
individual's free choice will a government policy to inter-
fere with lifestyles be acceptable. Reasons to believe that
lifestyles are not determined by free choice may be because
the knowledge about die healdi risks of certain lifestyles
appears to be unevenly distributed, or because one be-
lieves there are structural limitations to the freedom of
choice, as for instance in pricing policies of certain foods.
Furthermore, lifestyles may be partly determined by the
social environment, by definition unevenly distributed
among socioeconomic groups.
• Policy options
Health education campaigns aim at influencing people's
individual choices in lifestyles, through information. As
such they can contribute to the necessary knowledge
about the health consequences of such choices. They are
often viewed as the back bone of policies to decrease
SEHD. Unfortunately we also know that health educa-
tion campaigns do not always reach everyone, nor is their
effectiveness equal in different socioeconomic groups
(Holme etal. 1985).
Policy measures aimed at more structural changes, such as
pricing policies, are another option. Because of their
economic character, they require intersectoral action.
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To the extent that lifestyles are determined by social
environment, the policy response will be quite different
and should concentrate on changing social structures
rather than guiding individual preferences. The determi-
nant then is no longer lifestyles but the social environ-
ment, and will be discussed there.
• Policy dilemmas
A policy to change peoples lifestyles, beyond giving infor-
mation, very soon interferes with an essential political
good, that of the freedom to act. Interference with free
choice in our societies is usually unacceptable, unless the
health risks involved will affect others in society. The
state has rights to limit the freedom of the individual for
the good of society, for instance in the case of epidemic
disease. Also in some societies the free choice of parents
is limited if it threatens the health of dependent children,
although interestingly enough in The Netherlands vacci-
nation of children has never been compulsory, for the
simple reason that the state was not allowed to interfere
with the parents free choice based on religious beliefs.
Furthermore, in some cases interference with free choice
can be justified on the paternalistic argument: inter-
ference for the individual's own good. An example of a
paternalistic policy is the obligation to use seat belts.
Given the value attached in the western world to individ-
ual freedom, only liberal paternalistic policies seem to be
acceptable, for instance pricing policies. For some even
pricing measures to make unhealthy lifestyles less attrac-
tive, as opposed to pricing policies to give healthy choices
a fair chance, are rejected for that reason.
Another dilemma concerning pricing policies is the
possible conflict between the potential health benefit and
other policy goals. The EC subsidies to tobacco farmers
are a good example of a choice against health in favour of
economic growth.
Social environment
• Causes
The health determinants in the social environment are
really at the centre of the socioeconomic differences in
health problems (Marmot &. Morris 1984). They are
essential for the very existence of socioeconomic dif-
ferences in health since education, income, and occupa-
tion are but proxies which identify groups in society with
distinct cultures and lifestyles. It is often these distinct
cultures and lifestyles which are in themselves determi-
nants of health. The health beliefs and attitudes are the
legacy of the social environment of childhood; lifestyles
and the ability to change them are clearly elements of
social structures. In our view it is the government's re-
sponsibility to strive for an equal distribution of these
structures. However, a large part of them cannot be
changed, and resulting inequalities in health must be
conceived as unavoidable. As a consequence, inequalities
resulting from differences in lifestyle, so far as these are
embedded in social structures, are also partly unavoidable.
• Policy options
Social structure is the result of political decisions that
have very little to do with health. Social structures may
cause health differences but health differences will seldom
be the reason for major social reforms. Sometimes how-
ever decisions are taken in social and economic policy
that may have far-reaching effects on health, without
taking the health impact into account. Since health has
long been viewed as a randomly distributed good rather
than a basic capability in society of which the quantity
and the distribution can be influenced by policy, policy
decisions made to influence other basic capabilities have
not been considered in the light of their effect on health.
A very real policy option is to make the impact on the
distribution of health a point to be considered in the
general policy making process.
• Policy dilemmas
Some of the socioeconomic differences in health caused
by social environmental factors may be considered una-
voidable, any policy to change social structures to reduce
socioeconomic differences in health will definitely have
to take the competing societal goals into account. Dif-
ferences in health are at best weighed against other effects
such as economic growth and employment, all factors that
influence (the distribution of) basic capabilities. If one
wants to incorporate changes in the social environment,
other than indirect changes through lifestyles or exposure
to physical risk factors, into a policy to reduce socioeco-
nomic differences in health, the key question to ask would
be at what point health differences become so pronounced
that they can no longer be ignored in the socioeconomic
policy making.
Health services
• Causes
The provision of health care services is the central ele-
ment and responsibility of health policy. The equal dis-
tribution and access of health services has long been the
most important subject for debate on the just distribution
of health. Many industrialized countries have found a
system whereby at least the essentials of medical care are
available to all, regardless of income. The importance
attached to equal access to care is easily defended by the
notion that health is a basic capability and that everyone
should have equal opportunity to attain it. If health care
contributes to the attainment of health it should rightly
be equally accessible to all.
However, even in countries which have gone much fur-
ther in their policy of equal access, either through a
national health service or through obligatory social insur-
ance, health differences persist. Some of these are the
result of unequal use of the available services, others
appear to be related to unequal effectiveness of services
(Yelin et al. 1983, Leon & Wilkinson 1989, Mackenbach
et al. 1989). Use of available services may in part reflect
individual preferences and would therefore in our concept
not be a subj ect for policy measures. Unequal effectiveness
of available services on the other hand, is unlikely to be
intended, either by the user or the provider. In fact it
reduces the individual's capability of attaining health. As
such it would be just to strive for equal effectiveness of
care.
Equity in healdx
The same applies to preventive care. Many preventive
programmes are based on the premise that all those at risk
are reached by their efforts. The estimates of effect on which
decisions to invest are often made assume not only an even
distribution of risk factors in the population, but certainly
an average effectiveness for all population groups.
We know, however, that the risk factors are not equally
distributed in the population. If we could assume equal
effectiveness of preventive interventions on these risk
factors we could therefore expect a reduction of socio-
economic differences in health as a result of any such
programme. Reality is different. Women in the lower
socioeconomic groups are least likely to respond to an
invitation for a PAP smear, compliance with anti-hyper-
tension medication is not equal in all socioeconomic
groups, children of migrant families are less likely to
attend child clinics and receive total vaccination (Gun-
ning-Schepers 1981). There are apparently constraints
that mean that preventive services do not reach the
general population as they were intended to. Because of
their unequal effectiveness, these very preventive services
may be one the reason for the unequal distribution of risk
factors, and thus of socioeconomic inequities in health.
• Policy options
Although health care is probably not the most important
determinant of SEHD, health care policy will obviously
be a major channel to reduce socioeconomic differences
in health. The potentials for reducing socioeconomic
differences in health through health care policies are in
the reduction of the unequal distribution of incidence of
ill health through health promotion and disease preven-
tion, or in the reduction of the unequal distribution of the
outcome of health care, the prognosis of the patient.
To adequately reduce inequities, health services policies
will have to look beyond equal distribution and access to
equal effectiveness. Of course the same applies to preven-
tive services, which may also influence the lifestyle deter-
minants.
• Policy dilemmas
In most cases tailor made preventive programmes will cost
more than one uniform campaign. It is a political decision
to what extent these extra investments are justified,
whereby they will have to take into account what other
services are forgone in doing so. In this weighing of
cost-effectiveness, the ultimate goal either of maximizing
health or of achieving an equal distribution of health will
play a role. Since health is a basic capability necessary to
attain other goods such as economic wealth, reducing the
overall potential to attain such other goods may limit
society more than the existence of health differences will.
In that case the obvious justification for the reduction of
socioeconomic health differences may cease to exist.
As with the preventive services, investments in time and
personnel to achieve equal effectiveness of curative ser-
vices will again have to be weighed against the effect we
wish to achieve. However, more than with preventive
services the ultimate goal will be equal distribution rather
than maximizing health since, having made the decision
to supply health services, unequal effectiveness can never
be considered positively. Once a person is ill many ele-
ments of free choice are eliminated and the outcome is
very much in hands of the health care professionals. They
therefore have the first responsibility in seeing that the
patient gets adequate care, irrespective of income or edu-
cation. This becomes especially important in situations
where financial resources are becoming increasingly
scarce. When rationing of some sort begins to apply in
health care, equal treatment to all patients may no longer
be guaranteed. Those are the situations in which socio-
economic differences in health are most likely to be
sustained through health policy.
CONCLUSIONS
In the first part of this article we argued that (socioeco-
nomic) health differences are not necessarily inequities.
Striving for the reduction and prevention of all SEHD
would result in an unacceptable interference with indi-
vidual freedom. Starting from the ideas we have in the
western world on freedom, the principle of equality in
health can only be conceived as a means to guarantee
each individual freedom of choice, based on the concep-
tion of health as a basic capability. Therefore, only in-
equalities resulting from an unequal distribution of oppor-
tunities to be as healthy as possible, to the extent that this
distribution can be controlled, must be conceived as
inequities.
If a distribution of opportunities for health cannot be
controlled, resulting inequalities are unavoidable. At least
some determinants of SEHD lead to unavoidable inequal-
ities. The possibilities for controlling the social environ-
ment in particular, by definition a crucial determinant of
socioeconomic differences in health, should not be over-
estimated. Because some differences in life styles are em-
bedded in the social environment, the same doubts apply
to life styles as an option to reduce SEHD.
The possibilities to achieve equity in health was the
second main issue of this article. Although there is great
potential for improving the distribution of health through
intersectoral action, given the determinants of socio-
economic differences in health discussed earlier, there
very often will be a conflict of interest with other societal
goals. We identified four dilemmas, which show that
equity in health cannot always be target number 1.
The major constraint in trying to redress SEHD results
from the fact that interventions on most determinants of
health will have to come from departments other than the
department for public health. We argued that health
should be pursued for its instrumental value in the context
of the principle of attaining equality in basic capabilities.
Whereas the primary goal of health policy is (equality in)
health, other policy fields have other primary goals, and
health effects and distributional effects on health are side
effects: income distribution is not determined by its health
effects, educational policies are not primarily aimed at
reducing socio-economic differences in health, employ-
ment may be considered more important than the reduc-
tion of work related risks. In intersectoral action conflicts
between the goal of equality in health and goals in other
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policy fields, especially economic policies, are therefore
to be expected.
Although sometimes policy measures in several policy
fields will positively influence the distribution of oppor-
tunities for health, the difficult choices occur when one
basic capability has to be foregone for another one. The
theories on social justice are useful in determining what
basic capabilities are, but they do not offer much help in
creating a hierarchy within these basic capabilities. What
should society choose; equal opportunities to achieve
health or equal opportunities to achieve gainful employ-
ment? The predominance of economic interest will be
especially noticeable in differences in health between
socioeconomic groups, because these inequalities in
health are inextricably related to socioeconomic struc-
tures. Placed in the wider spectrum of social policy, equity
in health may therefore not always be given highest
priority. However, what we can aim for is to include the
health effects in the decision making process. Given the
skewed distribution of the determinants of socioeconomic
differences in health that are influenced by intersectoral
action, a concern for the health effects of such decisions
will almost always reduce socioeconomic differences in
health even if the distribution of health effects is not
directly addressed.
Conflicts between health policy and other policy goals are
absent in the context of health care policy. Because health
is the primary goal in the policy of the public health
department, we should at any rate strive for the realization
of the equality principle in this context, interpreted as
equal access and effectiveness. However, here the prin-
ciple of equality in health care has to compete with the
principle of maximizing health. If one accepts that health
is a basic capability, equality should prevail over effi-
ciency, at least in curative care. In case of preventive
health care, giving priority to maximizing health can
sometimes be useful, as this may in the long run contribute
to a situation with greater freedom of choice for each
individual.
A third dilemma we pointed out applies to interventions
on the determinant life style. Before implementing such
interventions, their impact on the free choice of an indi-
vidual has to be assessed. Given the high value we attach
in the western world to free choice, policy measures aimed
at improving health related behaviour should in first
instance be aimed at the determinants of this behaviour,
like knowledge about health risks. Interventions that
strongly interfere with the individual free choice could to
some extent be justified on the harm of certain behaviour
to others, or to the individual himself, so-called paternal-
istic intervention. But, in general, the individual's free
choice should be respected in policy measures, and equity
in health should be made subordinate to that.
A fourth and last dilemma concerns the conflict between
the wish to control the distribution of genetic factors and
ethical principles. If genetic factors appear to be important
in the explanation of SEHD, a policy to 'redistribute'
these characteristics among socioeconomic groups will be
constrained by ethical considerations.
If we accept that the principle of equal opportunities to
attain health should be the main goal of health policy,
one should not expect this goal to be fully realized. Not
only will some determinants of SEHD, especially social
structures, hardly be open to intervention, but conflicts
between health policy goals and other societal goals can
also be expected. Because health is not always the primary
concern in intersectoral action, we should not be too
optimistic towards the possibilities to reduce or prevent
SEHD in western countries. The most policy makers can
strive for is making the topic of health, and, more speci-
fically, the topic of equal opportunities to attain health,
an issue in the intersectoral policy making process.
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